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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, : Case No. 910165 
v. i 
KEELEY L. ROWE, : Category No. 14 
Defendant-Respondent. t 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari 
to the Utah Court of Appeals. This Court has jurisdiction to 
hear the case under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Did the majority of the court of appeals erroneously 
conclude that a violation of the nighttime search warrant 
authorization provision, Utah Code Ann. S 77-23-5 (1990), 
constitutes a constitutional violation such that the 
"exclusionary rule" is applicable? Did the majority of the court 
of appeals erroneously conclude that the officers acted in "bad 
faith" in executing the search warrant, in view of their 
contemporaneous valid arrest of the home's owner? 
The determination of whether a violation of a rule of 
criminal procedure amounts to a constitutional violation 
requiring the exclusion of evidence is a question of law and is 
reviewed on appeal under a correction of error standard. State 
v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1987); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
2. Did the majority of the court of appeals 
erroneously conclude that the mere status of being an "invited 
guest" in a third-party's home "vests" the guest with a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence such that the 
guest may challenge the validity of a search warrant for the 
home? Did the majority improperly adopt a "legitimately on the 
premises" test for determining if a defendant's fourth amendment 
rights are implicated in a search? 
The decision to grant a motion to suppress and preclude 
the introduction of evidence seized is a matter of law and 
reviewed on appeal under a correction of error standard; however, 
the underlying factual determinations of the trial court should 
be given deference and are reversed only if clearly erroneous. 
State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 16 n.3 (Utah April 23, 
1991); State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). 
3. Did the majority of the court of appeals 
erroneously conclude that the state must prove a defendant's 
abandonment of an expectation of privacy by "clear, unequivocal 
and decisive evidence;" and did the majority erroneously apply a 
subjective standard in evaluating whether abandonment occurred by 
improperly requiring the state to prove that defendant did not 
abandon the property "to avoid self-incrimination?" 
This is a question of law, subject to the standard of 
-2-
review delineated in paragraph 2. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Relevant constitutional provisions, statutes and rules 
for a determination of this case are, in pertinent part: 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-7-5 (1990). Issuance of 
warrant - Time and place arrests may be made. 
A magistrate may issue a warrant for 
arrest upon finding probable cause to believe 
that the person to be arrested has committed 
a public offense. If the offense charge is: 
(1) a felony, the arrest upon a warrant 
may be made at any time of the day or night. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5 (1990). Time for 
service - Officer may request assistance. 
(1) The magistrate must insert a 
direction in the [search] warrant that it be 
served in the daytime, unless the affidavits 
or oral testimony state a reasonable cause to 
believe a search is necessary in the night to 
seize the property prior to it being 
concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered, or 
for other good reason; in which case he may 
insert a direction that it be served any time 
of the day or night. An officer may request 
other persons to assist him in conducting the 
search. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-23-10 (1990). Force used 
in executing warrant - Notice of authority 
prerequisite, when. 
When a search warrant has been issued 
authorizing entry into any building, room, 
conveyance, compartment or other enclosure, 
the officer executing the warrant may use 
such force as is reasonably necessary to 
enter: 
(1) If, after notice of his authority 
and purpose, there is no response or he is 
not admitted with reasonable promptness; or 
(2) Without notice of his authority and 
purpose, if the magistrate issuing the 
warrant directs in the warrant that the 
-3-
officer need not give notice. The magistrate 
shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, 
that the object of the search may be quickly 
destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that 
physical harm may result to any person if 
notice were given. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Keeley Laursen Rowe, was charged with 
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
and (b)(ii) (Supp. 1989) (R. 10). Prior to trial, defendant 
moved to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to a search 
warrant executed on a third-party's home in which she was present 
(R. 28-31). Consistent with local rule, the matter was 
considered by the court without hearing, on the written memoranda 
submitted by the parties, and denied (R. 32-41, 51-55, 60-61). 
Subsequently, defendant waived her right to a jury; a bench trial 
was held on March 21, 1989, in the Fifth Judicial District Court, 
Washington County, Utah (R. 50, 62-65; T. 5). During trial, 
defendant reasserted her motion to suppress the evidence (T. 7-8, 
104-05). The motion was again denied (T. 108). Defendant was 
convicted as charged (R. 65; T. 181). Defendant was sentenced to 
the statutory indeterminate term of zero to five years; but, 
imprisonment was stayed and defendant was placed on probation (R. 
80-84). 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals, in a spilt 
decision, reversed defendant's conviction and remanded the case 
for a new trial, concluding that (1) the search warrant 
improperly authorized a nighttime search, (2) the remedy for a 
-4-
defective nighttime search authorization was suppression, (3) the 
officers' reliance on the magistrate's authorization for a 
nighttime search was unreasonable, (4) defendant, as an "invited 
guest" in a third-party's home, had an expectation of privacy in 
the home sufficient to allow her to challenge the search warrant, 
and (5) defendant had not abandoned an expectation of privacy in 
her purse left in the home. State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah 
App.), cert, granted, 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah July 3, 1991). 
On April 9, 1991, the state timely filed a petition for 
writ of certiorari in this Court. On July 3, 1991, the petition 
was granted. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The state accepts the statement of the facts contained 
in the opinion of the court of appeals with the following 
additions. 
On October 6, 1989, a confidential informant told the 
police that Stan Swickey, the individual whose home was 
subsequently searched, had a large quantity of methamphetamine 
and marijuana at his residence in Leeds, Utah, and had offered to 
sell the informant "whatever he wanted" (R. 56-57; T. 12). Based 
on this information and prior police monitored drug purchases 
from Swickey, a felony arrest warrant for Swickey and a search 
warrant for his residence were obtained on the night of October 
7, 1989 (T. 9-12, 14). The search warrant authorized the 
officers to execute it at night and without announcing their 
presence (R. 57). Within hours, the officers entered the Swickey 
-5-
home to arrest Mr. Swickey and execute the search warrant (T. 15, 
18)-
Upon entering the home, the officers unexpectedly 
encountered eight other individuals in the home for what appeared 
to be a party (T. 16). Defendant was standing in the kitchen and 
the others were seated around a table in the living room (T. 16, 
21). Drugs were in plain view in a cup on the living room table 
(T. 26, 57-58, 126).* The officers arrested Swickey pursuant to 
the arrest warrant and informed him of the search warrant (T. 17, 
22). 
The remaining guests, including defendant, were told 
that they were free to leave the premises (T. 30). Defendant 
asked if she could get her shoes. An officer accompanied her to 
a bedroom, where 
[f]rom a pile of clothing next to the file 
cabinet she — in which this purse was a part 
of that pile, she removed her shoes in that 
pile. In that pile there were some pants, 
some women's temple garments, several other 
items. She picked those up and her shoes up, 
and [the officer] asked her, "Is that 
everything of yours in this room? She said 
that was, and exited the room and [the 
officers] permitted her to leave. 
(T. 30-31). 
After defendant and the others had left, the officers 
conducted a search of the home (T. 31, 44). Drugs were found 
throughout the house, including a pile of methamphetamine on the 
1
 Edwin Davis was arrested for possession of the drugs in his 
cup on the table. He was tried with defendant and convicted of the 
lesser included offense of resorting (T. 181). 
«6-
dresser in the room from which defendant had retrieved her shoes. 
A vial of methamphetamine was found in the purse which had been 
left on the floor. When subsequently questioned by the police, 
defendant admitted that the purse and vial were hers. She stated 
that she had been "ripping offH Swickey during the party by 
filling the vial from the supply of methamphetamine on the 
dresser without Swickey's knowledge and without payment to him 
(T. 35, 49). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The fundamental error of the Rowe majority is their 
conclusion that the search and seizure in question implicated the 
fourth amendment. This error was predicated on the court of 
appeals' misconstruction of the nature of the procedural rules 
governing the execution of search warrants and the nature of the 
remedy for their violation. By equating a violation of the 
nighttime search warrant authorization provision to a 
constitutional violation, the majority improperly rejected this 
Court's prior determinations that a violation of the procedural 
rules governing the execution of search warrants does not 
implicate constitutional rights such that the exclusionary rule 
is applicable. Further, the majority erred in concluding, under 
the facts of this case, that the officers acted unreasonably in 
relying on the magistrate's nighttime search authorization. 
Based on its conclusion that any procedural violation 
was of constitutional magnitude, the majority of the court of 
appeals next considered and erroneously concluded that defendant, 
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as a social guest, had a sufficient expectation of privacy under 
the fourth amendment in the third-party home so as to permit a 
challenge to the validity of the search warrant. By doing so, 
the majority adopted a "legitimately on the premises" test for 
determining whether any constitutionally protected interest of 
defendant's had been infringed by the police action. The 
application of such a test for fourth amendment analysis is in 
conflict with established law. 
The majority of the court of appeals erroneously 
concluded that, before a defendant may be found to have abandoned 
a constitutionally protected interest in property, the state must 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant did not 
abandon the property to "avoid self-incrimination." This 
conclusion erroneously applies a subjective analysis to 
abandonment and is contrary to the prevailing view. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the court of 
appeals' holding which suppressed the evidence seized and 
reversed defendant's conviction, and should reinstate and affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED 
THAT THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE WAS APPLICABLE TO 
A PROCEDURAL VIOLATION OF THE NIGHTTIME 
SEARCH WARRANT PROVISION, UTAH CODE ANN. S 
77-23-5 (1990). 
In challenging the search warrant for the Swickey home, 
defendant never raised an issue of the warrant's substantive 
.-8-
statutory grounds of whether the affidavit in support of the 
search warrant contained sufficient justification for a no-knock 
entry, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10 (1990), and for a 
nighttime search, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5 (1990).2 
(See Constitutional Provisions and Statutes, supra at 4, for 
complete text of statutory provisions.) On appeal, the majority 
of the Rowe panel upheld the lower court's determination that 
sufficient justification existed for an unannounced entry, but 
overruled the magistrate's conclusion that a nighttime search was 
permissible. State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 732-33 (Utah App.), 
cert, granted, 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah July 3, 1991).3 
Finding that the affidavit in question did not contain 
a sufficient justification for the nighttime entry, the majority 
then erroneously concluded that any violation of the statutory 
provision was of constitutional magnitude. Jci. at 738-39. This 
2
 Defendant also claimed that the search warrant contained the 
wrong date. Both the trial and appellate courts summarily 
discounted this argument. 
3
 The appellate court concluded that the mere presence of 
narcotics was insufficient justification for a nighttime search in 
that the affidavit did not establish that the "contraband was 
likely to be destroyed, concealed, damaged, or altered during the 
night." Rowe, 806 P.2d at 734. For purposes of this review, the 
state is not challenging the court's conclusion that there was 
insufficient written factual justification for the nighttime entry. 
However, § 77-23-5 does not require that the grounds stated for the 
nighttime entry override the preference for a daytime entry. 
Instead, the statute requires the issuing magistrate to be provided 
with the officer's reason for wanting a nighttime entry so that the 
magistrate may independently determine if the request constitutes 
a "good reason" for the more intrusive entry. As noted by the 
court of appeals, some recognized reasons are safety concerns, the 
dangerousness of the offender, or the likely quick removal of the 
evidence. Id. at 734 and n.5. 
9 
error is fundamental to the court's decision. For by concluding 
that the violation was of constitutional dimension, the majority 
also erroneously considered defendant's expectation of privacy 
under the fourth amendment.4 Both predicates are false. 
The court of appeals' conclusion that noncompliance 
with a statutory procedural provision requires suppression of the 
evidence ignores Utah precedent and is in conflict with federal 
law. In State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366# 1369 (Utah 1987), this 
Court concluded that despite an officer clearly acting outside of 
his statutory geographical authority in an undercover purchase of 
narcotics, suppression of the evidence obtained would be "a 
remedy out of all proportion to the benefits gained to the end of 
obtaining justice while preserving individual liberties 
unimpaired." This holding was based on a recognition that 
[o]nly a 'fundamental' violation of a 
rule of criminal procedure requires automatic 
suppression, and a violation is 'fundamental' 
only where it, in effect, renders the search 
unconstitutional under traditional fourth 
A
 The validity of the majority's conclusion that defendant had 
an expectation of privacy in the Swickey home sufficient to 
challenge the manner of entry will be discussed in Point II of this 
brief. However, the majority also implicitly assumed that 
defendant would have standing to challenge the manner of entry even 
if viewed as only a procedural violation. This assumption is 
incorrect. Under traditional standing concepts, a movant must 
establish a "causal relationship alleged between the injury to 
[the party], the governmental actions and the relief requested." 
Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983). (See also 
footnote 7, infra at 19, for discussion of analytical differences 
between traditional standing and a fourth amendment expectation of 
privacy.) But, even if it is assumed that defendant has standing 
to challenge the search on the procedural ground that § 77-23-5 was 
violated, as will be more fully discussed, defendant's interests 
would not be affected by whether the search occurred in the day or 
night. 
10 
only where it# in effect, renders the search 
unconstitutional under traditional fourth 
amendment standards. Where the alleged 
violation . . . is not 'fundamental' 
suppression is required only where: 
(1) there was 'prejudice' in the sense 
that the search might not have occurred or 
would not have been so abrasive if the rule 
had been followed, or (2) there is evidence 
of intentional and deliberate disregard of a 
provision of the rule. 
It is only where the violation also 
implicated fundamental/ constitutional 
concerns, is conducted in bad-faith or has 
substantially prejudiced the defendant that 
exclusion may be an appropriate remedy. 
Id. at 1368-69 (quoting Commonwealth v. Mason, 507 Pa. 396, 490 
A.2d 421 (1985)) (emphasis in original). Accord United States v. 
Schoenheit, 856 F.2d 74, 76-77 (8th Cir. 1988) (noncompliance 
with nighttime authorization prerequisites does not automatically 
require suppression of evidence); United States v. Searp, 586 
F.2d 1117f 1125 (6th Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 440 U.S. 921 
(1979) (violation of nighttime provision is procedural and does 
not require suppression; cited with approval in Fixel): United 
States v. Shelton, 742 F.Supp. 1491, 1502-03 (D. Wyo. 1990) 
(violation of nighttime search provision is statutory and does 
not require suppression; citing Fixel as being in accord). See 
also Allen v. State, 85 Md.App. 657, 584 A.2d 1279, 1286, cert. 
denied, 323 Md. 1, 590 A.2d 158 (1991) (failure to comply with 
statutory provisions governing questioning to proceed with pat-
down is procedural violation and does not require suppression); 
State v. Ford, 801 P.2d. 754, 764-66 (Or. 1990) (failure to 
comply with no-knock statutory provision was excusable and did 
not violate the federal or state constitution); People v. Dvla, 
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536 N.Y.S.2d 799, 808-09, 142 A.D.2d 423 (N.Y. App. 3988) 
(distinct trend is towards a recognition that violation of 
procedural rule does not implicate fourth amendment rights and 
therefore suppression is not appropriate); Commonwealth v. Mason. 
507 Pa. 396, 490 A.2d 421, 423-24 (1985) (suppression not 
appropriate remedy for technical violations of procedural rules 
governing the execution of search warrants); State v. Brock, 294 
Or. 15, 653 P.2d 543, 547 (1982) (suppression not required for 
violation of nighttime search provisions); Commonwealth v. Musi, 
486 Pa. 102, 404 A.2d 378, 384-85 (1979) (suppression not 
required for violation of procedural rules governing execution 
and return on search warrant). 
Despite this case law, the court of appeals concluded 
the § 77-23-5 was not ministerial or technical in nature because 
it "established procedures for protection of substantive rights." 
Rowe, 806 P.2d at 738. While certainly the nighttime 
authorization provision was "designed . . . to govern the conduct 
of . . .officers" and encompasses "statutory conditions which 
explicate fundamental purposes of the Fourth Amendment," this 
does not mean that the statute is of constitutional stature. 
United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d at 1124, and cases cited above. 
Instead, the clear intent of § 77-23-5 is simply 
to ensure that the fact that a nighttime 
search is contemplated by the police is 
brought to the attention of a magistrate and 
that he or she consciously decide whether 
such a particularly abrasive intrusion is 
called for in a given situation. 
United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d at 1121 (commenting on identical 
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federal rule). For this reason, 
it is important to differentiate between the 
right to be free from unnecessary and 
frightening intrusions by the State into our 
homes in the middle of the night and the 
procedures which have been established to 
protect that right. 
Id. at 1122 (emphasis in original). Accord United States v. 
Schoenheit, 856 F.2d at 77 (the nighttime search authorization 
rule and the fourth amendment are "not coextensive"). Thus, the 
court's reliance on general comments that non-warrant nighttime 
searches were abhorred under the common law or that a night 
intrusion is one element in considering the reasonableness of a 
search is misplaced. See Rowe, 806 P.2d at 738-39. For here, 
assuming arguendo that the police failed to comply with the 
procedural requirements of § 77-23-5, "the search was 
nevertheless 'reasonable,' in the constitutional sense, because 
it was conducted pursuant to a valid state warrant, and met the 
requirements of the fourth amendment." United States v. Searp, 
586 F.2d at 1122. Accord United States v. Schoenheit. 856 F.2d 
at 77 (there is "no authority for concluding that a search is per 
se unconstitutional simply because it was conducted" at night). 
The purpose of the statutory search warrant entry 
requirements is to minimize the invasion of privacy which is 
being authorized by the issuance of the warrant and to protect 
the safety of the persons and property involved. State v. Buck, 
756 P.2d 700, 701 (Utah 1988). Here, the issue is not whether 
Swickey's home could be searched, but simply when. 
Contemporaneously with the issuance of the search warrant, the 
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magistrate also issued a felony arrest warrant for Swickey, the 
owner/occupant (T. 9-12, 14; R. 57). Since under Utah Code Ann. 
S 77-7-5 (1990), a felony arrest warrant may be executed "at any 
time of the day or night," the intrusive nighttime entry was 
already statutorily permitted under the felony arrest warrant. 
Under these facts, to forgo the nighttime search authorization 
would have resulted in a greater invasion of privacy to the 
resident of the home and target of the warrants. The officers 
could have proceeded to validly enter Swickey's home during the 
night to arrest him, and then could have permissibly secured his 
home until dawn when a non-nighttime search warrant could be 
executed. Such a delay would not have preserved any additional 
constitutional rights or served any practical usefulness. Accord 
State v. Buck, 756 P.2d at 702-03 (a violation of the no-kncck 
provision does not require suppression where the violation does 
"not contribute to the invasion of privacy"). Certainly as to 
this defendant, whether the search was conducted 
contemporaneously with the nighttime arrest or in the morning, 
the facts would have remained the same. Since she was not a 
resident of the house, she would have been asked to leave the 
home with the other guests once Swickey was arrested; and, she 
would have had no right to re-enter the home and remove any 
property from the premises prior to the search taking place in 
the morning. Accord United States v. Schoenheit, 856 F.2d at 77 
(to show prejudice, a defendant must establish that, absent the 
nighttime entry, "the search would not have otherwise occurred or 
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would not have been so abrasive if the Rule had been followed"). 
See also Utah R. Crim. P. 30 ("any error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a party 
shall be disregarded"). 
The majority also erroneously concluded that the 
officers in question had acted in "bad faith" in relying on the 
magistrate's authorization and executing the search warrant at 
night. Rowe, 806 P.2d at 738. The appellate court addressed the 
issue because the trial court had concluded that even if a 
violation had occurred, the officers had acted in good faith 
under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), such that an 
exception to the exclusionary rule would be applicable. But the 
issue is not whether a Leon-type good faith is applicable, as no 
constitutional violation occurred. Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1368-69, 
and cases cited therein. Accord State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 
419 (Utah 1991) (good faith exception is only applicable to 
fourth amendment violations). Thus, Judge Orme's appendix 
discussion questioning the propriety of a good faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule, Rowe, 806 P.2d at 740-43, is irrelevant to 
any determination in this case.5 
What has been considered under the procedural violation 
analysis, discussed above, is whether the defendant has been 
prejudiced by the nighttime search and whether the police acted 
5
 Despite the Rowe appendix, it is clear that the majority 
opinion only considered the good faith exception under the federal 
standard as no state constitutional issue of good faith was raised 
or argued. 
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in Mbad faith" by intentionally and deliberately disregarding the 
statutory rule. State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1368; United States 
v. Schoenheit, 856 F.2d at 77; United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d 
at 1125. "Bad faith" has further been defined as acting with an 
"intent to avoid the limitations of the fourth amendment," Searp, 
586 F.2d at 1120, or as involving instances where the 
"intolerable government conduct . . . is widespread and cannot 
otherwise be controlled," Commonwealth v. Musi, 404 A.2d at 384. 
Here, the only factual predicate for the court's conclusion that 
the officers acted unreasonably was that police officers are 
presumed to know the requirements for authorization of a night 
search and so this officer should have been aware of deficiencies 
in the affidavit. Rowe, 806 P.2d at 738. But this presumption 
must be tempered with the fact that, arguably, a justifiable 
reason for a night search existed in that the officers were 
already making a nighttime entry to arrest the owner/occupant of 
the premises.6 While the affidavit in support of the search 
warrant did not specifically contain this information, it is 
reasonable to assume that any magistrate, given such facts, would 
have authorized a contemporaneous search. See United States v. 
Searp, 586 F.2d at 1122 (a factor to be considered in evaluating 
the extent of non-compliance with the nighttime authorization 
provision is whether given the facts omitted, a reasonable 
magistrate would have authorized the night search). As such, any 
6
 The state is not claiming that this is the only basis upon 
which the magistrate could have authorized the nighttime search 
warrant. 
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failure to provide written justification for the authorization 
was "ministerial" and does not fall qualify as "outrageous" 
police conduct. Accord Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1369; Searp, 586 F.2d 
at 1122. 
For these reasons, the majority opinion's conclusion 
that a violation of the entry requirements for execution of a 
search warrant is of constitutional magnitude and "mandates" 
suppression is erroneous and should be reversed. For even 
assuming a violation occurred and that a remedy for this 
defendant is appropriate, that remedy should be limited to 
"official sanctions, discipline, and/or civil and criminal 
liability." Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1369. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED 
THAT THE STATUS OF INVITED GUEST IN A THIRD 
PARTY HOME VESTS THE GUEST WITH A LEGITIMATE 
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN THE RESIDENCE SUCH 
THAT THE GUEST HAS THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE 
VALIDITY OF A SEARCH WARRANT FOR THE HOME. 
Based on its conclusion that there was a violation of 
the nighttime search authorization provision and that the 
violation was of constitutional magnitude, the court of appeals 
considered whether defendant had an expectation of privacy in the 
Swickey home based on her status as a guest. In concluding that 
she did, the court ruled that defendant's fourth amendment rights 
were violated by the night search of the Swickey home and the 
subsequent seizure of her purse which she left in the residence 
after the police arrested Swickey. Assuming this Court agrees 
that a violation of the nighttime search authorization provision 
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constitutes a fourth amendment violation, the court of appeals' 
conclusion that defendant's fourth amendment rights were violated 
should be reviewed. 
Because constitutional protections against unlawful 
searches and seizures are "personal rights which . . . may not be 
vicariously asserted," Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 
(1978) (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 
(1969)), "[t]he touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is 
whether a person has a 'constitutionally protected reasonable 
expectation of privacy.'" California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 
211 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). Any inquiry into whether a 
challenged search has violated the fourth amendment rights of a 
criminal defendant must necessarily involve, therefore, a 
determination of "whether the disputed search and seizure has 
infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment 
was designed to protect." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140. As part of 
this substantive determinationf a court must inquire "first, 
whether the proponent of a particular legal right has alleged 
'injury in fact,' and, second, whether the proponent is asserting 
his own legal rights and interests rather than basing his claim 
for relief upon the rights of third parties." Id., at 139. 
Beginning with Katz, the issue of whose fourth 
amendment rights may be implicated shifted from a separate 
analysis of traditional "standing" principles to the "substance 
of the defendant's claim that he or she possessed a 'legitimate 
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expectation of privacy' in the area searched. "7 Rawlinas v, 
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980). To establish a 
constitutionally legitimate expectation of privacy, a defendant 
must first exhibit "an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy 
and, second, . . . the expectation [must] be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 
(Harlan, J., concurring). Accord Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12. 
Therefore, as part of a defendant's substantive claim that fourth 
amendment protections are at issue, a defendant must establish 
that his legitimate expectation of privacy was invaded by the 
challenged police conduct. Rawlinas, 448 U.S. at 104; Rakas, 439 
U.S. at 131 n.l. 
At trial and on appeal, the state argued that defendant 
lacked a sufficient constitutional privacy interest in the 
Swickey residence so as to challenge the adequacy of the search 
7
 The Rowe court, as did the state in its initial briefing and 
petition, utilized the term "standing" interchangeably with the 
concept of "expectation of privacy." This is analytically 
improper. Standing, in its traditional sense, involves a 
procedural determination separate and apart from the substantive 
claim. See Terracor v. Utah Bd. of State Lands, 716 P.2d 796, 798 
(Utah 1986) ("[t]he doctrine of standing is intended to assure the 
procedural integrity of judicial adjudications by requiring that 
the parties to a lawsuit have a sufficient interest in the subject 
matter of the dispute and sufficient adverseness that the legal and 
factual issues which must be resolved will be thoroughly 
explored"). However, an expectation of privacy for purposes of 
search and seizure law is a component part of the substantive 
determination of whether fourth amendment rights were implicated by 
a search. Rakas. 439 U.S. at 428. Accord State v. Schlosser. 774 
P.2d 1132, 1138 (Utah 1989) ("standing" is not a jurisdictional 
issue but a "substantive doctrine that identifies those who may 
assert rights against unlawful searches and seizures"). 
19 
warrant for the home.8 Rowe, 806 P.2d at 735. In a split 
decision rejecting the state's position, a majority of the court 
of appeals concluded: 
[Defendant's status as an invited guest in 
the home vested her with a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the home and she 
thereby gained sufficient standing to 
challenge the validity of the search warrant 
and the resulting search. 
Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736. Despite the court's use of the accepted 
terminology of "reasonable expectation of privacy," the 
majority's opinion amounts to no more than an application of the 
formerly rejected "legitimately on the premises" doctrine and is 
in conflict with proper fourth amendment analysis. Minnesota v. 
Olson, 110 S.Ct 1684, 1688 (1990) (to claim fourth amendment 
8
 Despite the clear pronouncements, cited above, that a 
defendant has the burden of establishing his privacy interest, 
several panels of the Utah Court of Appeals have imposed the 
obligation on the state to affirmatively challenge a defendant's 
"standing" at trial or be barred from raising the issue on appeal. 
Rowe, 806 P.2d at 733. See also State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 
885-86 andn.8, cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah App. 1990); State 
v. Tavlor, 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 62 (Utah App. Sept. 12, 1991). 
The court of appeals predicates its rulings on State v. 
Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1138-39, in which this Court concluded that 
the state had waived any challenge to the defendant's "standing" to 
contest the search by failing to raise the issue at trial or in the 
state's appeal. However, the state would submit that Schlosser 
stands for the unremarkable proposition that an appellant may be 
barred from raising new issues on appeal, but an appellee may raise 
additional arguments as alternative grounds for affirming a lower 
court's decision. 
This Court should clarify that the state is under no 
obligation to give "notice" at the trial level that a defendant 
will be put to his burden of establishing a legitimate expectation 
of privacy . See State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d at 885-86. Instead, 
defendants must assume their burden of demonstrating that they have 
an expectation of privacy in the place or object as part of their 
overall substantive challenge to the constitutional validity of the 
search or seizure. 
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protections, a defendant must establish not merely that he is 
legitimately on the premises but that he has a "legally 
sufficient interest" in the premises searched); Rawlincrs, 448 
U.S. at 105 ("'arcane' concepts of property law" are not 
determinative of the legal right to claim fourth amendment 
protection"); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142 (rejecting the concept of 
"legitimately on [the] premises. . . [as] too broad a gauge for 
measurement of Fourth Amendment rights"); Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 
(rejecting traditional property rights in the invaded place as 
determinative of fourth amendment implications). (See also 
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 145-46 nn. 13 and 14, for numerous criticisms 
by commentators and inconsistent applications by courts of 
"legitimately on the premises" test.) 
Defendant did not produce any evidence that she had a 
greater expectation of privacy in the home than any of the other 
seven party guests present when the police entered the home (T. 
30-31, 96-97, 105-107). The court of appeals agreed that 
defendant was simply an invited social guest in the home and that 
there was no evidence that "would lead to the conclusion that she 
intended, or might have been invited, to remain overnight on the 
night of the search." Rowe, 806 P.2d at 735. But, the court 
concluded that this status, alone, was sufficient to establish a 
constitutional expectation of privacy in the entire home. In so 
ruling, the majority relied on Minnesota v. Olson and analyzed 
only federal supreme court decisions interpreting fourth 
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amendment rights.9 
In Olson, the United States Supreme Court held that an 
overnight guest had a sufficient expectation of privacy in his 
host's home so as to require an arrest warrant to enter the 
third-party home and arrest the guest. 110 S.Ct. at 1688. The 
Supreme Court concluded that an overnight guest is "much more 
than just legitimately on the premises." Id. at 1688. Instead, 
an objective expectation of privacy is associated with being 
9
 The state recognizes the at least two justices of this Court 
have recently stated that federal case law on standing is not 
binding precedent on state courts. State v. Thompson, 157 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 6, 10 (Utah March 21, 1991) (Zimmerman, J., concurring, 
joined by Durham, J.). This view is predicated on the differences 
between federal constitution case and controversy application and 
state constitution separation of powers analysis. See Utah Rest. 
Ass'n. v. Davis Ctv. Bd. of Health, 709 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Utah 1985) 
(standing of an association to bring a declaratory judgment action 
on behalf of its members); Terracor v. Utah Bd. of State Lands. 716 
P.2d 796, 798-99 (Utah 1986) (comparing "case and controversy" 
language of federal constitution with separation of powers 
provisions of Utah Constitution); Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768 
P.2d 455, 456-57 (Utah 1989) (application of standing principles to 
"overbreadth" statutory claim). It has also been applied in 
determining state search and seizure claims under article I, § 14 
of the Utah Constitution. See State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 469-
70 (Utah 1990) (determining on state constitutional grounds that a 
warrant was required before a search of the interior of a vehicle 
parked at a residence could occur); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d at 
418 (determining on state constitutional grounds that defendants 
had an expectation of privacy in bank records secured, 
unconstitutionally, under the Utah Subpoena Powers Act). 
Here, defendant never asserted a state constitutional 
claim at trial. On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, no issue of 
state constitutional law was raised or argued. As such, the 
majority in Rowe properly limited its opinion to an interpretation 
of federal case law and fourth amendment analysis. Under fourth 
amendment analysis, no separate procedural issue of standing 
exists. Instead, the formerly distinct issue of standing merges 
into and becomes "invariably intertwined" with "substantive Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence." Rawlinas v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. at 111-12. 
For these reasons, this Court should limit its review to the issue 
of the correctness of the court of appeals' interpretation and 
application of federal law. 
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permitted to reside overnight since "[w]e are at our most 
vulnerable when we are asleep because we cannot monitor our own 
safety or the security of our belongings." Icl. at 1689. 
Despite the limited holding of Olson, the majority of 
the court of appeals broadly and erroneously interpreted the 
opinion so as to confer fourth amendment protections on persons 
who are simply consensually present in a home at the time of the 
search.10 Significantly, the majority failed to cite any 
support for this expansive interpretation. Every other court 
which has interpreted Olson, has required more than an invited 
guest presence in the third-party home. United States v. Davis, 
932 F.2d 752, 757 (9th Cir. 1991) (a defendant who had previously 
10
 While the concurring opinion in Rowe disclaims that the main 
opinion should be construed "so broadly as to guarantee every 
person invited into a home the type of privacy protected by the 
fourth amendment," 806 P.2d at 739, nothing in the main opinion 
curtails this application. Indeed, the holding is explicit that 
the mere status of being an invited guest is sufficient to create 
an expectation of privacy in the home. Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736. 
While social guest status, per se, is insufficient for 
constitutional purposes, the state does not contend that Olson 
mandates that a guest stay overnight to gain an expectation of 
privacy. Accord United States v. Davis. 932 F.2d 752, 757 n.3 (9th 
Cir. 1991) I Olson does not modify Rakas and pre-existing law that 
a person may have a "legally sufficient interest in a place other 
than his own home so that the Fourth Amendment protects him from 
unreasonable governmental intrusion into that place"); Davis v. 
Florida, 582 So.2d 61 (Fla. App. 1991) (recognizing that Olson does 
not preclude a non-overnight guest from establishing a valid 
expectation of privacy but finds under the facts, insufficient 
evidence of any constitutional interest). Rather, the totality of 
the circumstances must be analyzed to determine if a defendant has 
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched aside 
from his mere invited presence. Olson, 110 S.Ct. at 1688. Here, 
the state contends that defendant failed to carry her burden to 
establish sufficient facts supporting an expectation of privacy 
and, therefore, the court of appeals had an insufficient factual 
basis from which to legally conclude that such an interest existed. 
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lived in an apartment, continued to pay part of its rent, 
retained a key to the premises, had independent access to the 
apartment, and continued to store personal items there, including 
storing some items in a locked safe to assure privacy, had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment); Lewis v. 
United States, 594 A.2d 542, 544 (D.C. App. 1991) (a party guest 
who fell asleep on a bed for several hours was not an overnight 
guest and did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
apartment); United States v. McNeal, 735 F.Supp. 738, 741-42 
(N.D. Ohio 1990) (a defendant did not have "standing" to contest 
his warrantless arrest in his lover's apartment despite his 
possession of a key to the apartment, where no evidence was 
presented that he was intending to spend that particular night 
and he claimed he was only in the apartment ro use the phone); 
State v, Cortis, 237 Neb- 97, 465 N.W.2d 132, 138-39 (1991) (the 
boyfriend and codefendant of the owner of a home did not have 
interest sufficient to challenge a search warrant for the home 
since he was not a "current overnight guest at the time of the 
police intrusion," even though he had spent rhe night at the home 
on previous occasions); State v. Whitrock, 468 N.W.2d 696, 702-C5 
(Wis. 1991) (under the totality of the circumstances! a defendant 
who occasionally stayed overnight at a duplex failed to establish 
sufficient other facts to support any constitutionally protected 
interest in the duplex); State v. Brosnan, 589 A*2d 1234, 1236-
37 (Conn. App. 1991) (an overnight guest who was sleeping on the 
owner's bed when the police entered the apartment had a 
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reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment); Owens v. 
State, 589 A.2d 59, 64 (Md. App. 1991), cert, pending, A.2d 
, (Md. 1991), (a defendant who had spent the night before in 
an apartment, left his suitcase there but was not spending the 
night at the time of the search, did not have an expectation of 
privacy in the apartment); People v. Bass, 1991 WL 190380 (111. 
App. Sept. 27, 1991) (transitory presence in premises does not 
create an expectation of privacy); Commonwealth v. Ferretti, 395 
Pa.Super. 629, 577 A.2d 1375, 1380 (1990) (a mere friend, guest 
or visitor in a home does not have standing to contest a search 
warrant for the home); Crisp v. State, 195 Ga.App. 786, 395 
S.E.2d 47, 48 (1990) (mere presence in a hotel room when it is 
searched is insufficient to establish any expectation of 
privacy); People v. Harris, 797 P.2d 816, 817 (Colo. App. 1990) 
(a social guest, as opposed to an overnight guest, does not have 
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the host's apartment). 
See also United States v. Donnes, 752 F.Supp 411, 417 (D. Wyo. 
1990) (a defendant who had lived in the searched home 
continuously for several months, had left furniture and 
belongings in it, and had padlocked the home when he left it 
sometime prior to the search, had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy to contest its search); People v. Murray, 565 N.Y.Supp.2d 
212, 213 (N.Y. App. 1991) (a defendant had standing to challenge 
his warrantless arrest in his girlfriend's apartment where he was 
spending the night); Harless v. State, 577 N.E.2d 245, 248 (Ind. 
App. 1991) (defendant who stayed frequently overnight at his 
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girlfriend's home and paid some of the utility bills had an 
expectation of privacy in the home); People v. Olson. 198 
Ill.App.3d 675, 144 111.Dec. 806, 556 N.E.2d 273, 276-77 (1990) 
(a defendant who was sleeping in a bed in his underwear had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in another's hotel room); State 
v. Carter. 22 Conn.App. 118, 576 A.2d 572, 574-75 (1990) (a 
defendant who was "clearly more than a transient houseguest" had 
standing to challenge the search of his host's apartment); State 
v. Corpier, 793 S.W.2d 430, 436-37 (Mo. App. 1990) (a defendant 
who spent three to four nights a week at a friend's apartment for 
"liaisons with his girlfriend" was more than a casual guest or 
visitor and so had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
apartment); State v. Tapio, 459 N.W.2d 406, 413 (S.D. 1990) (a 
defendant had standing to challenge the search of his 
girlfriend's trailer in which he was spending the night); State 
v. Walker, 236 Neb. 155, 459 N.W.2d 527, 531 (1990) (a defendant 
who was an overnight guest had standing to challenge a search of 
the premises)• 
In conflict with this consensus view, the Rowe opinion 
states: 
Olson squarely holds that an overnight guest 
has . . . standing, but nothing in Olson 
suggests that a social visit of a duration 
less than overnight would deprive a guest of 
standing. While an overnight stay may 
connote a qualitatively greater expectation 
of privacy than some social visits, given the 
typical characteristics of overnight stays 
such as showering, changing clothes, and the 
use of toilet facilities, the distinction is 
really more one of degree than of kind. For 
example, the seclusion extended to a parent 
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who pauses to feed or diaper an infant while 
visiting friends implies a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, although the visit 
might be a short one, and certainly less than 
an overnight stay. Visitors of comparatively 
short duration may nap, change, use the 
toilet, or dine without any expectation of 
interference from the world at large. In 
this case, defendant felt secure enough In 
the home to remove her shoes, leave her purse 
beyond her view, and roam to rooms other than 
where her fellow guests were playing cards. 
Rowe, 806 P.2d at 735-36 (emphasis added). This analysis fails 
to consider the constitutionally required objective 
reasonableness of any subjective expectation of privacy. 
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988). 
The facts relied on by the majority do not establish 
that defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
Swickey's home at the time of the search. The actions of having 
one's shoes off, standing in the kitchen, and having one's purse 
in another room are not uncommon for any individuals familiar 
with each other in a home, especially when the apparent purpose 
of the gathering was to casually gamble, drink and use drugs (T. 
16). Further, the court's conclusion that defendant left her 
purse in the bedroom because she "felt secure" in the home is 
inconsistent with the evidence. By defendant's own admission, 
she was using the purse to secrete the drugs which she was 
stealing from her host throughout the evening (T. 35). By having 
the purse in the bedroom, she could more easily accomplish her 
illegal activities since the methamphetamine she was stealing was 
located on the dresser in the bedroom (T. 35). A legitimate 
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expectation of privacy cannot be justified by subjective hopes of 
concealing illegal conduct. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 143 
n.12; State v. Lee. 633 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah), cert, denied, Lee v. 
Utah. 454 U.S. 1057 (1981). 
The only distinction alluded to by the majority, 
between defendant and the other party guests, is that defendant 
and Swickey had an "intimate relationship" in the past "which may 
have continued to the time" of the search. Rowe, 806 P.2d at 
735. But, the fact that such a relationship may have existed at 
some time remote from the search is not relevant to the inquiry 
of whether defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
Swickey's home on the night in question. "Any other conclusion 
would result in an overnight guest's having a permanently 
protected fourth amendment interest in a place he or she once 
stayed, no matter how remote in time." State v. Cortis, 465 
N.W.2d at 139. 
It is defendant who has the burden of establishing 
facts supporting a claim that her personal rights were violated. 
Society of Prof. Journalists v. Bullock. 743 P.2d 1166, 1171 
(Utah 1987); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334, 1335 (Utah 1984). 
Mere speculative possibilities will not suffice. State v. 
Constantino, 732 P.2d 125, 126-27 (Utah 1987) (permissive use for 
purposes of "standing"11 will not be inferred for the driver of 
another's vehicle); State v. Iacono. 725 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah 
11
 See footnote 7, infra at 19, discussing the analytically 
improper use of "standing" in determining substantive fourth 
amendment law. 
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1986) (son's "standing" not presumed from the fact that the 
trailer searched was his mother's and his clothing was found 
inside); State v. Grueber. 776 P.2d 70, 75 (Utah App.), cert. 
denied. 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989) (defendant's live-in relationship 
with the owner of the vehicle and weapon searched and seized 
insufficient to establish a constitutional right to challenge the 
search); State v. DeAlo. 748 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
(permissive use for the driver of a vehicle not inferred from the 
owner's permission for the passenger to use the vehicle). Here, 
the facts simply established that defendant was an "invited 
guest" who, along with seven other guests, was legitimately on 
the premises at the time of the search. Without more, this 
status is legally insufficient to establish a fourth amendment 
interest. 
POINT III 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED 
THAT EVIDENCE OF ABANDONMENT MUST BE 
ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, 
AND ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED A SUBJECTIVE STANDARD 
BY REQUIRING THAT "ABANDONMENT IN THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT SENSE" COULD ONLY BE ESTABLISHED IF 
THE STATE PROVED THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT 
ABANDON THE PROPERTY TO "AVOID SELF-
INCRIMINATION. " 
While a party guest would not have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the host's home, a guest could retain a 
reasonable privacy interest in the guest's personal possessions 
in the home. In the court of appeals, the state argued that any 
legitimate expectation of privacy which defendant may have had in 
her purse was abandoned by defendant disclaiming ownership of the 
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purse and leaving it on the floor in the bedroom when she left 
the home prior to the police commencing their search. 
In rejecting the state's argument, the majority 
concluded that the state must prove that a defendant abandoned 
any legitimate expectation of privacy by "clear, unequivocal and 
decisive evidence." Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736. While the issue is 
one of first impression in Utah, the better and more consistent 
standard of proof would be proof by "a preponderance of the 
evidence." 
Only a minority of jurisdictions have directly 
articulated the standard of proof applicable to a determination 
of abandonment. The court of appeals relied on Friedman v. 
United States, 347 F.2d 697, 704 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 382 
U.S. 946 (1965), which, without discussion, cites a "clear and 
convincing" standard as appropriate. However, Friedman would 
appear to be inconsistent with the majority position that in 
considering the admissibility of evidence, a "preponderance" 
standard is applicable. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 445 
(1984) ("preponderance of the evidence" standard is applicable in 
considering the inevitable discovery exception to the 
exclusionary rule); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 
n.14 (1974) (in reviewing the voluntariness of a consent to 
search, the "controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings 
should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of 
the evidence"). 
But even if a "clear and convincing" standard of proof 
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were determined to be appropriate by this Court, the court of 
appeals' conclusion that the state had failed to prove 
abandonment would be erroneous. 
The majority opinion relied on two false predicates in 
reaching its conclusion. First, the court concluded that 
evidence in support of abandonment must be "measured from the 
vantage point of the defendant, and not the police . . . [as] 
[i]t is only the defendant's state of mind that counts," citing 
in support Narain v. State, 79 Md. App. 385, 556 A.2d 1158, 1161 
n.4, cert, denied, 317 Md. 71, 562 A.2d 718 (1989). Rowe, 806 
P.2d at 736. If Narain truly stands for the proposition that 
abandonment is solely a subjective determination,12 it is in 
conflict with the overwhelmingly accepted view that 
the test to be applied in determining whether 
a person has abandoned property is an 
objective one - the words used, the conduct 
exhibited, and other objective facts such as 
where and for what length of time the 
property is relinquished and the condition of 
the property. 
O'Shaucrhnessv v. State, 420 So.2d 377, 379 (Fla. App. 1982). 
Accord United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1989); 
United States v. Oswald, 783 F.2d 663, 668 (6th Cir. 1986); 
United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1983), 
cert, denied, 464 U.S. 859 (1983); United States v. Kendall, 655 
F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982); 
12
 The language quoted is dicta contained in a footnote 
discussing the issue of the voluntariness of an abandonment 
occurring in the context of prior illegal police conduct. Narain, 
556 A.2d at 1161 n.4. Narain has not been cited or approved of by 
any other court. 
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United States v. David, 756 F.Supp. 1385, 1390 n.l (D. Nev. 
1991); United States v. Walker, 624 F.Supp. 99, 101 (D. Md. 
1985). 
While the majority opinion correctly stated that proof 
of abandonment is a factual determination "inferred from 'words 
spoken, acts done, and other objective facts,'" a consideration 
of the court's second false predicate makes clear that the 
majority erroneously applied a subjective standard in assessing 
abandonment. In concluding that the state failed to carry its 
burden of proof, the court considered defendant's denial of 
ownership of the purse and then stated: 
That repudiation of interest in property 
located in the bedroom is consistent with a 
conclusion of abandonment. It is not, 
however, inconsistent with a conclusion of a 
mere disclaimer of interest to avoid self-
incrimination . 
Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736-37. This creates an impossible standard to 
meet as most fourth amendment abandonment occurs for the singular 
reason that a defendant does not wish to incriminate himself by 
retaining possession of contraband or instrumentalities of crime. 
The proper and critical inquiry is not the subjective reason or 
intent for the abandonment but "whether the person prejudiced by 
the search . . . voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise 
relinquished his interest in the property in question so that he 
could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy with 
regard to it at the time of the search." United States v. 
McKennon, 814 F.2d 1539, 1546 (11th Cir. 1987) (emphasis in 
original). 
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Further, the majority of the court of appeals' panel 
factually erred in only considering defendant's disclaimer of 
ownership of the purse. Defendant did not simply deny that the 
purse was hers, she physically left it on the floor knowing that 
a search was to be conducted after she departed. This 
combination of "words spoken and acts done" clearly established 
that defendant abandoned any reasonable expectation of privacy in 
her purse prior to the search commencing. Again, the majority 
cited no case law to support its contention that a disclaimer of 
ownership combined with a relinquishment of physical control does 
not constitute "abandonment in the fourth amendment sense." 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the state respectfully 
requests this Court to reverse the court of appeals' decision and 
affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /7VQ day of October, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
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Keeley Laursen ROWE, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 890396-CA* 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Feb. 8, 1991. 
Defendant was convicted of possession 
of controlled substance before the Wash-
ington County Court, Fifth District Court, 
Robert T. Braithwaite, Circuit Court Judge, 
sitting by special assignment, and she ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., 
held that (1) information presented in sup-
porting affidavit was sufficient to justify 
inclusion of "no-knock" provision in search 
warrant; (2) information presented in sup-
porting affidavit was not sufficient to justi-
fy inclusion of nighttime search provision 
in search warrant; (3) defendant had stand-
ing to challenge adequacy of warrant au-
thorizing search of third party's home; (4) 
evidence failed to establish that defendant 
abandoned any standing she might have 
had to challenge search of third party's 
home; and (5) evidence gained during 
search would be suppressed. 
Reversed and remanded for new trial 
Garff, J., concurred and issued an opin-
ion. 
Jackson, J., dissented. 
1. Drugs and Narcotics *»189(3) 
Magistrate had sufficient basis to is-
sue "no-knock" warrant on basis of factual 
information presented in supporting affida-
vit even though affidavit was sparse; it 
was clear from affidavit that object of 
search was drugs located in residence, and 
magistrate could readily and properly infer 
that drugs could be quickly destroyed if 
notice was given. U.C.A.1953, 77-23-10. 
2. Drugs and Narcotics *»189(2) 
Affidavit lacked sufficient factual in-
formation to support nighttime search war-
rant for drugs in residence, where there 
was nothing in affidavit supporting inclu-
sion of nighttime service authority other 
than preprinted language and information 
received from confidential informant, and 
there was nothing inherent in narcotics 
search which would necessitate search at 
night U.C.A.1953, 77-2S-5(l); U.CJL 
1953, 77-54-11 (Repealed). 
3. Criminal Law *»1031(1) 
For State to assert on appeal that de-
fendant had no standing to challenge ade-
quacy of search warrant, State must raise 
standing issue at trial. ILS.CJL Const 
Amend. 4. 
4. Searches and Seizures *»164 
Defendant had standing to challenge 
adequacy of warrant authorizing search of 
third party's home, where evidence indi-
cated that defendant had intimate relation-
ship with third party and had stayed over 
night in home on several prior occasions, 
and defendant felt secure enough in home 
to remove her shoes, leave her purse be-
yond her view, and roam to rooms other 
than where her fellow guests were playing 
cards, even though there was no evidence 
that defendant intended to remain over-
night on night of search. U.S.C.A. Const 
Amend. 4. 
5. Searches and Seizures e»164 
Evidence failed to establish that defen-
dant abandoned any standing she might 
have had to challenge search of third par-
ty's home which resulted in seizure of her 
purse, even though police officer asked de-
fendant if anything else belonged to her 
and she stated that she had retrieved 
everything in bedroom that was hers; de-
fendant's statement was not inconsistent 
with conclusion of mere disclaimer of inter 
est to avoid self-incrimination. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4. 
6. Criminal Law <s=>394.4(8) 
Items seized during search of home 
pursuant to invalid warrant could not be 
excepted from exclusionary rule based on 
officer's good faith reliance on deficient 
warrant, where although warrant allowed 
nighttime search, there was nothing in affi-
davit that would offer any basis to magi*-
STATE v. ROWE 
CtUu806 P.2d 730 (UtahApp. 1991) 
irate for finding of probable cause to allow 
nighttime search, and same officer pre-
pared affidavit, secured warrant, and exe-
cuted search, thus he had personal knowl-
edge of affidavit's contents. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4. 
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FACTS 
7. Searches and Seizures *»101, 141 
Mere ministerial and technical errors 
in preparation or execution of search war-
rants will not, without more, invalidate 
warrant UJ3.CA. ConstAmend. 4. 
8. Criminal Law *»394.4(1) 
Where statute dealing with searches 
establishes procedures for protection of 
substantive rights, violation of statute can-
not be dismissed as technical or ministerial 
in nature and suppression of evidence 
gained from challenged search is appropri-
ate remedy. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
». Criminal Law *»394.4(8) 
Evidence gained during search con-
ducted pursuant to invalid warrant would 
be suppressed; warrant authorized night-
time search when there was nothing in 
affidavit that would offer basis for finding 
of probable cause to allow nighttime 
search. U.OA.1953, 77-23-5; U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4. 
Shelden R. Carter (argued), Harris, Car-
ter & Harrison, Provo, for defendant and 
appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen., Christine 
F. Soltis (argued), Asst Atty. Gen., Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee. 
JJ. 
Before GARFF, JACKSON and ORME, 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
Defendant appeals her conviction of pos-
session of a controlled substance, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. { 58-37-8(2XaXi), (bXii) (1389). We 
reverse. 
1* While the date on the search warrant and 
supporting affidavit is October 8, 1988, it is 
clear from trial testimony that this was an er-
On October 7, 1988, a search warrant 
was issued and executed which authorized 
police to search for narcotics in the resi-
dence of Stan Swickey in Leeds, Utah. The 
warrant contained provisions which allowed 
police to enter "day or night," and to effect 
the search without notice, Le., on a "no-
knock" basis. The warrant was issued 
based on information in the officer's sup-
porting affidavit that a confidential infor-
mant had been contacted by Swickey, who 
told the informant that he, Swickey, had 
picked up a quantity of methamphetamine 
and marijuana that was being stored at his 
home in Leeds. The affidavit in support of 
the warrant contained preprinted language 
which stated that the affiant reasonably 
believed that the property sought could be 
easily destroyed or hidden or that harm to 
officers could result from notice. Follow-
ing this language are two boxes that the 
affiant can check, and which were checked, 
to request nighttime and "no-knock" au-
thority. No other factual information sup-
ports these requests. 
The warrant was executed on a "no-
knock" basis on October 7, 1988,1 at ap-
proximately 11:30 p.m. When police en-
tered Swickey's apartment, they found 
eight people, in addition to Swickey, in the 
home. Everyone except defendant was in 
the living room playing cards around a 
table. Defendant was in the kitchen. Af-
ter securing the home, the officers had 
defendant join the other people in the living 
room, while Swickey was taken into the 
kitchen and placed under arrest, pursuant 
to an arrest warrant, and advised of the 
search wan-ant Another individual was 
arrested when the officers saw drugs near-
by, in plain view. The remaining individu-
als,, including defendant, were told they 
could leave the premises. Defendant did 
not have her shoes, and asked if she could 
go to the bedroom to retrieve them. An 
officer accompanied her to the room, where 
she took the shoes from a pile of items. 
ror, and the date of issuance was actually Octo-
ber 7. 
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The officer asked her if she had everything 
that was hers from that room. Defendant 
replied that she did. 
After defendant left, the officers con-
ducted a search of the home. Narcotics 
were found throughout the house. A 
purse was seized from the pile in the bed-
room from which defendant had retrieved 
her shoes. Inside the purse was a small 
brown vial which contained methamphet-
amine. Also in the .purse were several 
documents that revealed that the purse be-
longed to defendant 
Police contacted defendant the next day 
and advised her that they had a purse that 
belonged to her. She came down to the 
station and was arrested. After being ad-
vised of her Miranda rights, defendant 
admitted that the purse and vial of drugs 
were hers. She told police that she had 
been "ripping off" drugs from Swickey. 
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to 
suppress the vial and other contents seized 
from her purse. The motion was accompa-
nied by a memorandum of points and au-
thorities. The state filed a memorandum 
opposing defendant's motion to suppress, 
and requested a ruling on defendant's mo-
tion. On March 17, 1989, the court issued 
a written order denying defendant's mo-
tion. 
Defendant waived her right to a jury 
trial, and a bench trial commenced on 
March 21, 1989. During the trial defen-
dant again renewed her motion to sup-
press. The basis of her argument was that 
the search warrant was defective since the 
supporting affidavit did not support the 
nighttime or "no-knock" authorization. 
The state argued that "Mr. Swickey would 
be the only one to have standing to object 
to that," and also argued the merits of the 
claim. The court denied the renewed mo: 
tion. Defendant was convicted as charged. 
Defendant raises three issues on appeal, 
all of which challenge the district court's 
failure to suppress the items seized from 
defendant's purse: 1) Whether there was 
2. Defendant addresses the third contention in a 
cursory, one paragraph argument She cites no 
authority for her position that the erroneous 
date invalidates the warrant, nor does she re-
sufficient factual information in the sup-
porting affidavit to authorize a nighttime 
search, 2) whether there was sufficient fac-
tual information in the supporting affidavit 
to authorize a "no-knock" search, and 3) 
whether the search was defective since the 
warrant was dated subsequent to the 
search.1 
"NO-KNOCK" SEARCH 
[1] Defendant argues there was insuffi-
cient factual information presented in the 
supporting affidavit to justify the inclusion 
of a "no-knock" provision in the search 
warrant Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10 
(1990) provides, in pertinent part, as fol-
' lows: 
When a search warrant has been is-
sued authorizing entry into any building, 
room, conveyance, compartment or other 
enclosure, the officer executing the war-
rant may use such force as is reasonably 
necessary to enter 
(2) Without notice of his authority and 
purpose, if the magistrate issuing the 
warrant directs in the warrant that the 
officer need not give notice. The magis-
trate shall so direct only upon proof, 
under oath, that the object of the search 
may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or 
secreted, or that physical harm may re-
sult to any person if notice were given. 
The affiant in this case requested a war-
rant to search for narcotics believed locat-
ed in a residence, by checking a preprinted 
provision on the affidavit form. A "no-
knock'1 warrant was requested based on 
the affiant's statement that such narcotics 
could be easily destroyed. Defendant ar-
gues that this statement alone is insuffi-
cient to justify issuance of a "no-knock" 
warrant However, reading the affidavit 
"in a common sense manner and as a 
whole/' State v. Paul, 226 Neb. 432, 405 
N.W.2d 608, 610 (1987) (quoting People v. 
Mardian, 47 Cal.App.8d 16, 85, 121 CaL 
Rptr. 269, 281 (1975)), we conclude that the 
spond to testimony given at trial that the date 
the warrant was issued was actually October 7, 
19S8. We therefore decline to address this is* 
sue. 
magistrate had sufficient basis to issue a 
"no-knock" warrant 
Although the affidavit is sparse, it is 
clear that the object of the search was 
drugs located in a residence. The small 
amount of drugs ordinarily found in a resi-
dential setting can be easily and quickly 
destroyed with even the briefest notice. 
Therefore, issuance of a "no-knock" war-
rant is justified if the affidavit suggests 
that a small, readily disposable, quantity of 
drugs in a residence is £he object of the 
search.1 The magistrate can readily and 
properly infer that such drugs could be 
quickly destroyed if notice is given. State 
v. Spisak, 520 P.2d 561 (Utah 1974); State 
v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363 (Utah CtApp. 
1987). While a detailed and factually spe-
cific affidavit is commendable and may fa-
cilitate subsequent review by an appellate 
court, it is not strictly necessary for the 
officer to elaborate on the obvious in the 
affidavit 
NIGHTTIME SEARCH 
[2] Defendant also argues that the sup-
porting affidavit lacked sufficient factual 
information to support a nighttime search. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5(1) (1990) pro-
vides in pertinent part 
The magistrate must insert a direction in 
the warrant that it be served in the day-
time, unless the affidavits or oral testi-
mony state a reasonable cause to believe 
a search is necessary in the night to seize 
the property prior to it being concealed, 
destroyed, damaged or altered, or for 
other good reason; in which case he may 
insert a direction that it be served any 
time of the day or night 
Previous Utah case law on this issue con-
strued a different code provision which re-
quired that a warrant be served in the 
daytime "unless the affidavits are positive 
that the property is on the person or in the 
place to searched/9 Utah Code Ann. 
177-54-11 (1953). See, e.g., State v. 
a» A more particularized showing may well be 
required if, for example, a large quantity of 
drugs Is sought. In such cases, as where the 
STATE v. ROWE 
Cite at S06 ¥2d 730 (UuhApp. m i ) 
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Treadway, 28 Utah 2d 160, 499 P.2d 846, 
848-49(1972). No Utah cases are drawn to 
our attention which have addressed the 
present code provision. 
The showing required by the present 
statute focuses not upon a positive showing 
that the property is at the place to be 
searched, but upon whether there are spe-
cial circumstances which would justify a 
search at night The statute does not spec-
ify how elaborate or detailed this showing 
must be, but merely requires that the "affi-
davits or oral testimony" must support a 
"reasonable cause" determination that a 
nighttime search is necessary. The precise 
quantum of information which would sup-
port this determination is not defined in the 
statute or in Utah case law and, as has 
been observed elsewhere, it is difficult "to 
anticipate all of the numerous factors that 
may justify the authorization of a night-
time search." People v. Kimble, 44 Cal.8d 
480, 749 P.2d 803, 810, 244 CaLRptr. 148, 
155, cert denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct 
188, 102 LEd.2d 157 (1988). Nonetheless, 
the statute clearly requires a particularized 
showing either that 1) a search is required 
in the night because the property is on the 
verge of being "concealed, destroyed, dam-
aged, or altered/' or 2) "for other good 
reason." Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5(1) 
(1990). 
Defendant argues that this particularized 
showing was not made in this case. We 
agree. Nothing in the supporting affidavit 
supported the inclusion of the nighttime 
service authority other than the preprinted 
language referred to above and the infor-
mation received from the confidential infor-
mant Contrary to our view that little 
more is required to justify a "no-knock" 
warrant than that the search is for narcot-
ics at a residence, we see nothing inherent 
in a narcotics search which would necessi-
tate a search at night, even though circum-
stances can easily be imagined which would 
suggest the propriety of such a search 
affiant has information of the on-going cultiva-
tion or manufacture of drugs, the exigency of 
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being made at night4 
In interpreting a similar statutory provi-
sion which allows a magistrate to authorize 
a nighttime search upon a showing of 
"good cause/' one appellate court ob-
served: 
(1) A magistrate cannot make a neutral 
and independent determination of wheth-
er authorization of nighttime service is 
necessary when faced with only concluso-
ry and ambiguous allegations in the affi-
davit; and (2) an affiant's averment that 
in his experience (generally) particular 
types of contraband are easily disposed 
of does not, in itself, constitute a suffi-
cient showing for the necessity of a 
nighttime search: a particular and specif-
ic reason for nighttime service must be 
set forth. 
People v. Mardian, 47 Cal.App.3d 16, 84, 
121 CaLRptr. 269, 281 (1975). 
In Mardian, the court held that the mag-
istrate had "good cause1' to issue a night-
time search warrant based on information 
provided in the affidavit that the contra-
band was in the process of being removed 
from the premises, and that the occupants 
would be able to remove the remainder of 
the contraband before a daytime warrant 
ready destructability, inherent with small quan-
tities of drugs, may not be present 
4. For example, if the supporting affidavit made 
a particularized showing that drugs were likely 
to be sold or consumed over the course of the 
night and evidence thereby lost, or that the 
supply was likely to be imminently moved en 
masse to a different location during the night, 
or that a safer search was likely at night because 
the house was abustle with activity during the 
day and no one but the occupant was likely to 
be home at night, then the propriety of a night-
time search becomes manifest We caution that 
a mere incantation of such circumstances will 
not justify a nighttime search—the required fac-
tual showing is not one which is conducive, for 
example, to preprinted language. Officers must 
"state a reasonable cause to believe a [night-
time] search is necessary...." Utah Code Ann. 
177-23-5(1990). 
5. Though we find it unnecessary to define what 
"other good reason" might encompass, but see 
note 4, supra, clearly one reason why a night-
time search might be authorized is where a 
nighttime search would increase the safety of 
the officers executing the warrant or the safety 
of the general public 
could be served since the occupants would 
be leaving at 6:00 a.m. Id. 121 CaLRptr. at 
282. See also Kimble, 749 P.2d at 810,244 
CaLRptr. at 155 (magistrate could infer 
that persons who had recently stolen stereo 
equipment would attempt to get rid of it 
quickly, since the theft was tied to a double 
homicide); State v. Paul, 225 Neb. 432,405 
N.W.2d 608 (1987) (affiant's statement that 
he smelled a strong odor of burnt marijua-
na coming from inside the residence in the 
afternoon supported an inference that mar-
ijuana was being consumed and thus de-
stroyed). See generally Annotation, Pro-
priety of Execution of Search Warrant at 
Nighttime, 26 A.LR.3d 951 (1969 & Supp. 
1990), 1 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal 
Procedure § 166 (13th ed. 1989); 2 W. La-
Fave, Search and Seizure § 4.7(b) (2d ed 
1987 & Supp.1990). 
The affidavit in this case contained no 
facts from which a magistrate could infer 
that the contraband was likely to be de-
stroyed, concealed, damaged, or altered 
during the night Additionally, we find 
nothing in the affidavit from which a mag-
istrate could reasonably infer that there 
was any "other good reason" to justify 
issuance of a nighttime search warrant1 
We therefore hold that it was error for the 
Of course, ordinarily a nighttime search 
would pose a heightened safety risk since people 
may tend to overreact to an entry by force in 
the dead of night. Darkness may exacerbate the 
reaction or heighten the confusion inherent in a 
search, especially one conducted on a "no-
knock" basis. Nonetheless, a specific showing 
that the safety of the public or the officers will 
be increased has been held a sufficient basis for 
a search at night Set, e,g.t Kimble, 749 ?2d at 
810, 244 CaLRptr. at 155 (magistrate could con* 
elude that permitting police to expedite their 
investigation was an exceptionally compelling 
reason to allow a nighttime search where dan-
gerous killer or killers were still at large). We 
note that other courts have rejected less compel-
ling kinds of "other good reason,1' such as be-
cause "appellant did not get home until '6.00 or 
after* and that appellant was not always present 
at his house,* People v. Watson, 75 Cal.App.3d 
592. 595,142 CaLRptr. 245,246 (1977); because 
the officer applying for the warrant "was on 
duty at night," Wiggin v. State, 755 ?2d 115, 
116-17 (Okla.Crim.App.1988); and because Tt 
[was] unknown when the person described (in 
the affidavit] will be at the premises." State v. 
Uen, 265 N.WJd 833, 840 (Minn. 1978). 
magistrate to authorize a nighttime search 
based on the facts in the affidavit present-
ed to him. 
STANDING, ABANDONMENT, "GOOD 
FAITH," AND SUPPRESSION 
The state argues that any inadequacy in 
the warrant is immaterial since 1) defen-
dant has no standing to challenge the ade-
quacy of the warrant to search Swickey's 
apartment since she was only a guest in 
the apartment; 2) any expectation of priva-
cy she had in the contents of her purse was 
abandoned when she told the officer she 
had everything that was hers when she 
departed Swickey's bedroom, leaving the 
purse behind; 8) any technical defects in 
the warrant were overcome by the officer's 
good faith reliance on the warrant in con-
ducting the search; and 4) any failure of 
the warrant to satisfy merely statutory 
requirements does not necessitate the sup-
pression of evidence, as would be the case 
where constitutional requirements are of-
fended. 
A. Standing 
[3] In her reply brief, defendant claims 
the state did not raise standing at trial 
While we reaffirm that such a failure 
would be fatal to the state's position, see 
State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 88&-86 & 
n. 8 (Utah CtApp.1990), defendant's claim 
is not borne out by the record. As indi-
cated above, the prosecutor specifically ar-
gued that "Mr. Swickey would be the only 
one to have standing to object to [the night-
time and 'no-knock' provisions of the war-
lint]." 
[4] Since the contention was adequately 
raised at trial, we now address the state's 
standing argument The state argues that 
defendant has no standing to challenge the 
adequacy of a warrant authorizing the 
search of a third-party's home since she 
was only a party guest in the home. We 
disagree. 
Since the decision in Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 847, 88 S.Ct 507, 19 
LEd.2d 576 (1967), ft has been the law 
that "capacity to claim the protection of 
the Fourth Amendment depends . . . 
STATE v. ROWE 
CIUMSO* T2d 730 (UuhAjpp. 1991) 
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upon whether the person who claims the 
protection of the Amendment has a legit-
imate expectation of privacy in the invad-
ed place." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 
128, 143, 99 S.Ct 421, 430, 58 LEd.2d 
887 (1978). A subjective expectation of 
privacy is legitimate if it is ['lone that 
society is prepared to recognize as *rea-
sonabler "] id. at 14&-144 n. 12,99 S.Ct 
at 430 n. 12, quoting Katz, supra, at 361, 
88 S.Ct at 516 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
Minnesota v. Olson, — U.S. , 110 
S.Ct 1684, 1687, 109 LEd.2d 85 (1990). 
The state's position that defendant failed to 
establish standing based on the nature of 
her presence in Swickey's home is argua-
ble, but not compelling. 
In Olson, the Supreme Court concluded 
"that Olson's status as an overnight guest 
is alone enough to show that he had an 
expectation of privacy in the home that 
society is prepared to recognize as reason-
able." Id. 110 S.Ct at 1688. In this case, 
the evidence did not establish that defen-
dant was an overnight guest in Swickey's 
home on the night of the search. There is, 
however, uncontroverted evidence that de-
fendant had an intimate relationship with 
Swickey, which may have continued to the 
time of the incident giving rise to this case, 
and had stayed overnight in the home on 
several prior occasions. However, the 
record lacks facts which would lead to the 
conclusion that she intended, or might have 
been invited, to remain overnight on the 
night of the search. 
But as we read Olson, there is no talis-
manic significance, in determining stand-
ing, to the length of time a social guest is 
in the home. Olson squarely holds that an 
overnight guest has such standing, but 
nothing in Olson suggests that a social 
visit of a duration less than overnight 
would deprive a guest of standing. While 
an overnight stay may connote a qualita-
tively greater expectation of privacy than 
some social visits, given the typical charac-
teristics of overnight stays such as shower-
ing, changing clothes, and the use of toilet 
facilities, the distinction is really more one 
of degree than of kind. For example, the 
seclusion extended to a parent who pauses 
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to feed or diaper an infant while visiting 
friends implies a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, although the visit might be a short 
one, and certainly less than an overnight 
stay. Visitors of comparatively short dura-
tion may nap, change, use the toilet, or dine 
without any expectation of interference 
from the world at large. In this case, 
defendant felt secure enough in the home 
to remove her shoes, leave her purse be-
yond her view, and roam to rooms other 
than where her fellow guests were playing 
cards. Eschewing an analysis based on 
free access and right to exclude others, the 
Olson Court focused on the social tradition 
that 
hosts will more likely than not respect 
the privacy interests of their guests, who 
are entitled to a legitimate expectation of 
privacy despite the fact that they have 
no legal interest in the premises and do 
not have the legal authority to determine 
who nay or may not enter the household. 
Id at 1689. 
A standing challenge in the search and 
seizure context is resolved by a determina-
tion of "whether governmental officials vi-
olated any legitimate expectation of priva-
cy." Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 
106, 100 S.Ct 2556, 2562, 65 LEd.2d 633 
(1980). We conclude that defendant's sta-
tus as an invited guest in the home vested 
her with a reasonable expectation of priva-
cy in the home and she thereby gained 
sufficient standing to challenge the validity 
of the search warrant and the resulting 
search. 
B. Abandonment 
[5] The state argues that even if defen-
dant might otherwise have standing to 
challenge the search warrant, she aban-
doned the purse, and thus abandoned any 
standing she might otherwise have had to 
challenge the search which resulted in sei-
zure of her purse. We disagree. 
"When individuals voluntarily abandon 
property, they forfeit any expectation of 
privacy in it that they might have had.11 
United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843, 
845 (D.C.Cir.1989) (quoting United States 
v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Or.), 
cert denied, 464 U.S. 859,104 S.Ct 184,78 
LEd.2d 163 (1983)). However, "abandon-
ment must be distinguished from a mere 
disclaimer of a property interest made to 
the police prior to the search, which under 
the better view does not defeat standing/' 
United States v. Morales, 737 T2d 761, 
763-44 (8th Cir.1984) (quoting 3 W. La-
Fave, Search and Seizure § 11-3, at 548-
49 (1978)). 
Whether defendant had abandoned her 
purse, under search and seizure analysis, is 
primarily a factual question of intent to 
voluntarily relinquish a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy, which may be inferred from 
"words spoken, acts done, and other objec-
tive facts." Thomas, 864 F.2d at 846 
(quoting United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 
174,176 (5th Cir.1973)). See also Gurgel v. 
Nichol, 19 Utah 2d 200, 429 P.2d 47, 48 
(1967) (abandonment ordinarily a question 
for the factfinder to be determined from 
the facts and circumstances). The burden 
of proving abandonment falls on the state, 
People v. Contreras, 210 Cal.App.3d 450, 
259 CaLRptr. 290, 293 (1989), and must be 
shown by "dear, unequivocal and decisive 
evidence." Friedman v. United States, 
347 F.2d 697, 704, (8th Cir.1965). See also 
United States v. Boswell, 347 KM 270, 
274 (D.C.1975); O'Shaughnessy v. State, 
420 So.2d 377, 879 (Fla.DistaApp.1982). 
It "is measured from the vantage point" of 
the defendant, and not the police. Narain 
v. State, 79 Md.App. 385, 556 A.2d 1158, 
1161 n. 4 (1989). "It is only the [defen-
dant's] state of mind that counts." Id. 
Defendant was allowed to leave the par 
ty along with Swickers other guests. She 
was conducted to the bedroom to retrieve 
her shoes and was given the opportunity to 
claim any other property belonging to her. 
When asked by the police officer if any-
thing else belonged to her, she stated that 
she had retrieved everything in the bed-
room that was hers. That repudiation of 
interest in property located in the bedroom 
is consistent with a conclusion of abandon-
ment It is not, however, inconsistent with 
a conclusion of a mere disclaimer of inter-
est to avoid self-incrimination. The state 
failed to produce evidence which would de» 
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velop this issue and perhaps meet its bur-
den of proving abandonment under search 
and seizure analysis. Accordingly, aban-
donment in the Fourth Amendment sense 
was not established by the state.9 
C. Good Faith 
[6] The state further claims the search 
can be validated by the officer's good faith 
reliance on the deficient warrant United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920-23, 104 
S.Ct 3405, 3419-20, 82 LEA2d 677 (1984). 
In Leon, the Supreme Court held that the 
6. It is not entirely clear that even If the state 
had proven abandonment defendant would be 
deprived of standing to challenge the seizure of 
her purse. "Property abandoned as a direct 
result of an unlawful intrusion into a person's 
right to be free from governmental interference 
cannot be lawfully seized." State v. Nichols, 563 
So.2d 1283,1286-87 (La.CUpp.1990). See also 
United States v. Roman, 849 F2d 920, 923 (5th 
Cir.1988); United States v. ToWert, 692 F.2d 
1041,1045 (6th Cir.1982), cert denied, 464 U.S. 
933.104 S.CL 337. 78 L.Ed2d 306 (1983); State 
* Jones, 553 Sold 928, 931 (La.CUpp.1989); 
Naram v. State, 79 McUpp. 385, 556 A-2d 1158. 
1160-61 (1989); State v. Huether, 453 N.WJd 
778. 781-82 (NJM990); State v. Wkitaker, 58 
WastUpp. 851.795 P.2d 182.183 (WaskCUpp. 
1990). Under this view, even if defendant aban-
doned her purse, she still would have standing 
since the abandonment was precipitated by an 
unlawful search of the residence in which her 
purse was located. 
7. Many have questioned tne Leon Court's nar-
row interpretation of the exclusionary rule's 
purpose. See, eg, United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 928-60, 104 S.O. 3430, 343CM5, 82 
LEd2d 677 (1984) (Brennan, J. dissenting); id 
at 960-80, 104 S.O. at 3445-56 (Stevens, J. 
dissenting); State v. Novemhrino, 105 NJ. 95. 
519 KM 820. 853-57 (1987); 1 W. LaFave, 
Search * Seizure f U , at 46 n. 5 (1987) (citing 
extensive critical authority); Wasserstrom 4 
Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: 
But Was it a Fair Trial?, 22 Am.CrimJJlev. 85, 
106-07(1984). See also State v. Mendoza, 748 
PJd 181.185 It n. 2 (Utah 1987) (criticizing the 
breadth of the language in Leon). The Leon 
rationale, viewed from a historical perspective, 
is treated at greater length in the Appendix to 
this opinion. 
1 We note that neither party addressed Utah's 
exclusionary rule, premised on Article I. Section 
14, of the Utah Constitution.. See State v. Laroc-
co, 794 P.2d 460.472 (Utah 1990) ("exclusion of 
illegally obtained evidence is a necessary conse-
quence of police violations of article L section 
14."). To date, neither the Utah Supreme Court 
nor this court has held that a parallel doctrine 
ROWE Utah 737 
(UuhApp. 11*1) 
exclusionary rule, aimed at deterring un-
lawful police conduct,7 does not bar evi-
dence obtained by officers acting in good 
faith reliance on a defective warrant1 Id. 
But the Leon doctrine is not without limita-
tions. When the magistrate reviewing the 
affidavit in support of the search warrant 
is not presented with sufficient facts to 
determine jprobable cause, the warrant can-
not be relied upon by searching officers. 
Id 468 Uii. at 915,104 S.Ct at 3417. We 
have detencnined that there was nothing in 
the affidavit in this case that would offer 
to the Lean exception would apply in the con-
text of Utah's exclusionary rule. See State v. 
Mendoza, 74* ?2d 181, 187 (Utah 1987) (Zim-
merman, J., concurring) (Court has not yet con-
sidered Leon-type exception under Article I Sec-
tion 14, of the Utah Constitution). See also 
State v. Thompson, 751 ?2d 805, 809 (Utah 
CtApp.1988) (concluding in dicta that Mendoza 
did not invalidate applicability of Leon). Many 
state court* have determined that exclusionary 
rules existing by virtue of state constitutional 
provisions are not subject to a Leon-type "good 
faith" exception. See, e-g., State v. Marsala, 216 
Conn. 150, 579 kid 58, 68 (1990); People v. 
Sundling 153 MichJtpp. 277, 395 N.W^d 308, 
315 (1986), appeal denied, 428 Mich. 887 (1987); 
State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553 
(1988); State v. Novemhrino, 105 NJ. 95, 519 
k2d 820, S57 (1987); People v. Bieelow, 66 
N.Y.2d 417, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 636-37, 4S8 
N.&2d 451, 457-58 (1985). At least one court 
has construed a statutory exclusionary rule to 
reject the ijeon exception. See, 04, Common-
wealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 370 a. 5, 476 
N.E2d 548. 554 n. 5 (1985). 
Notwithstanding any dicta to the contrary in 
our decision in State v. Thompson, 751 ?2d 805, 
809 (Utah CtApp.1988), it is far from dear 
whether the Leon exception has any vitality un-
der a state law analysis, especially since the 
basis and scope of our state exclusionary rule is 
somewhat unsettled. See State v. Larocco, 794 
T2d 460, 472-73 (Utah 1990). There may well 
be sound nsasons for state court interpretation 
at variance with the federal search and seizure 
rules. See generally, Durham, Employing the 
Utah Constitution, 2 Utah BJ. 25 (Nov. 1989); 
State v. Larocco, 794 f 2d 460 (Utah 1990); 
State v. Wests, 750 ?2d 1219, 1221 n. S (Utah 
1988). See also State v. Larocco, 742 ?2d 99, 
104-05 (Utah CtApp.1987) (Billings, J., concur-
ring and dissenting) ("[sjtate courts responding 
to the coniFusing and restrictive new federal 
interpretations are relying on an analysis of 
their own search and seizure provisions to ex-
pand constitutional protection beyond those 
mandated by the fourth amendment, often di-
rectly avoiding applicable United States Su-
preme Court precedent*). 
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any basis to the magistrate for a finding of 
probable cause to allow a nighttime search. 
It appears from the record that the en-
dorsement of the nighttime authorization 
was done in impermissible "rubber stamp" 
fashion. See Aguilar v. Texas, 878 UJ3. 
108, 111, 84 S.Ct 1509. 1512, 12 LJkL2d 
723 (1964). 
The question of the officer's good faith 
reliance is subject to de novo determination 
by this court United States v. Freitas, 
800 F.2d 1451, 1454 (9th Cir.1986). The 
conduct of the officers executing the 
search warrant must be objectively reason-
able. Leon, 468 U.S. at 919, 104 S.Ct at 
3419. Police officers cannot ignore an un-
ambiguous statutory directive to present 
the magistrate with "reasonable cause to 
believe a search is necessary in the night," 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5(1) (1990), and 
then claim that their very failure to do so is 
objectively reasonable conduct on their 
part See Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 n. 20,104 
S.Ct at 3419fn. 20 (objective standard re-
quires reasonable knowledge of the law by 
police officers); United States v. Freitas, 
610 F^upp. 1560, 1572 (N.D.CaL1985) (po-
lice agency must train officers, who have 
obligation to ensure that warrant comports 
with constitutional law), affd, 800 R2d 
1451 (9th Cir.1986). In this case, the same 
officer prepared the affidavit, secured the 
warrant, and executed the search.9 He had 
personal knowledge of the affidavit's con-
tents. This further persuades us that re-
liance on the warrant cannot be termed 
"reasonable" and thus the Leon exception 
does not apply in this case. 
D. Appropriate Remedy 
[7] Having so concluded, we must now 
turn our attention to whether the warrant's 
issuance in violation of the nighttime 
search requirements necessitates suppres-
sion of the evidence seized, namely the 
drugs and other Hems found in defendant's 
% We hasten to caution that the objective reason-
ableness of both the affiant officers and the 
executing officers must be considered in any 
review where the Leon doctrine is asserted. 
Were a subterfuge to be employed to insulate 
the affiant from actual service of the warrant in 
order to support a claim of good faith reliance 
purse. We recognize that mere ministerial 
and technical errors in the preparation or 
execution of search warrants will not, with-
out more, invalidate the warrant See, e.g., 
State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 702-03 (Utah 
1988) (violation of "knock-and-announce" 
rule did not require suppression when no 
one was at home at the time of the search 
to respond to the knock). Cf. State t. 
Kirn, 70 Haw. 206, 767 P.2d 1238,123M0 
(1989) (suppression may be appropriate for 
violation of constitution, statute, or admin-
istrative regulation). 
[8] However, where a statute establish-
es procedures for protection of substantive 
rights, such as section 77-23-5 does, viola-
tion of the statute cannot be dismissed as 
technical or ministerial in nature and sup-
pression of the evidence gained from the 
challenged search is the appropriate reme-
dy. Awaya v. State, 5 HawApp. 547, 705 
P.2d 54,59 (seizure of evidence not particu-
larly described in the warrant required sup-
pression), cert denied, 67 Haw. 685, 744 
P.2d 781 (1985); Wiggin v. State, 755 ?M 
115, 117 (Okla.CrimJlpp.1988) (violation of 
statute similar to section 77-23-5 mandates 
suppression); State v. Coyle, 95 Washed 1, 
621 P.2d 1256,1263 (1980) (suppression re-
quired for violation of notice requirement). 
But see State v. Brock, 294 Or. 15, 653 
P.2d 543, 545-46 (1982) (warrant allowing 
nighttime search without any showing of 
reasonable necessity not invalid and sup-
pression not required, when legislature had 
considered and declined to enact specific 
exclusionary rule for such circumstances). 
[9] The historical character of a night-
time search further persuades us that vio-
lation of the statute requires suppression. 
See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 
149, 45 S.Ct 280, 283-84, 69 LEA 543 
(1925) (question of reasonableness of a 
search must be viewed not only from the 
particular facts, but also with an eye to-
ward what was considered reasonable at 
by executing officers, we would not hesitate to 
fashion an appropriate remedy. See Stele * 
Buck 756 P.2d 700, 703 (Utah 1988) (Zimmer-
man, J- concurring) (where officers purposeful' 
ly serve a search warrant in order to avoid 
giving notice of authority and purpose, court 
will fashion a judicial remedy). 
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the time of the adoption of the Fourth 
Amendment). Searches of homes were 
soundly condemned by the drafters of the 
Bill of Rights and under English common 
law.11 See United States ex rel Boyance 
v. Myers, 898 F.2d 896, 897-98 (3d Cir. 
1968). "Night-time search was the evil in 
its most obnoxious form/' Monroe v. 
Pape, 365 U.S. 167,210,81 S.Ct 473,496, 5 
LE&2d 492 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing). The propriety of executing a search 
of an occupied dwelling at night is "sensi-
tively related to the reasonableness" prong 
of the Fourth Amendment United States 
* Gibbons, 607 F.2d 1320, 1326 (10th Cir. 
1979). See also State v. Lindner, 100 Ida-
ho 37, 592 P.2d 852, 857 (1979) ("entry into 
an occupied dwelling in the middle of the 
night is clearly a greater invasion of priva-
cy than entry executed during the day-
time"). 
We hold that an unmitigated violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5 (1990), as is 
present in this case, requires suppression 
of all evidence gained in the search exe-
cuted pursuant to the defective warrant11 
CONCLUSION 
The warrant was unlawful insofar as it 
authorized a search at night Defendant 
has standing to challenge that deficiency 
by virtue of her status as a guest in the 
home. The unlawful search cannot be 
saved on "good faith" or abandonment 
grounds. It follows that the evidence 
found in defendant's purse should have 
been suppressed. Her conviction is accord-
ingly reversed and the case is remanded 
for a new trial 
10. In an often-quoted speech condemning gen-
eral warrant*, Lord Chatham stated: 
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid 
defiance to all forces of the Crown. It may be 
frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow 
through it; the storm may enter, but the King 
of England may not enter, all his forces dare 
not cross the threshold of the ruined tene-
ment 
1T. Cooley, A Treatise on Constitutional Limita-
tions 611 (8th ed 1927). See also Appendix to 
this opinion. 
11. It may well be that section 77-25-5 merely 
codifies that which is already required under 
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GARFF, Judge (concurring): 
I concur in the main opinion but make 
three further comments. First, one should 
not construe the main opinion so broadly as 
to guarantee every person invited into a 
home the type of privacy protected by the 
fourth amendment Any number of possi-
bilities arise where one might be classified 
as an "invited guest," but may not neces-
sarily be entitled to a constitutional expec-
tation of privacy. For example, a Fuller 
Brush sales person, invited into a home to 
demonstrate a product, may not have 
standing to challenge an fliegal search war-
rant The emphasis in Olson, as here, is 
that the circumstances that create a legit-
imate expectation of privacy in the home 
must be such that society is prepared to 
recognize them as reasonable. That deter-
mination is fact sensitive and the test need 
not be overly complex. In Olson it was the 
mere fact that defendant was an overnight 
guest As an overnight guest, he had the 
reasonable expectation that he and his pos-
sessions would not be disturbed by anyone, 
and that when he was asleep and most 
vulnerable, he would be safe from any un-
warranted intrusion. Although here we 
are not sure whether defendant was intend-
ed to be an overnight guest, circumstances 
suggest that she was in a more privileged 
position in the house than a casual, card 
playing guest she had a close relationship 
with the home owner, had been there on 
other occasions, had free run of the house, 
and felt comfortable enough to "make her-
self at home," in a literal sense. 
The second point I would make is that 
whenever a "canned/' or preprinted affida-
vit is presented to a magistrate, he or she 
the Fourth Amendment See Gooding v. United 
States, 416 US. 430, 464,94 S.O.17S0,1797,40 
UBd.ld 250 (1974) (Marshall J., dissenting) 
(principle of requiring a showing of particular-
ized need to conduct a nighttime search may 
now be a "constitutional imperative"). See also 
State v. Menke, 7S7 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah CtApp. 
1990) (Utah Code Ann. f 77-7-15 codifies con-
stitutional requirements for investigative stops). 
But see Davis k Wallentine, A Mode! for Analyz-
ing the Constitutionality of Sobriety Roadblock 
Stops in Utah 3 B.Y.UJ.Pub.L 357, 363 (1989) 
(section 77-7-15 requirement is more strict than 
the Fourth Amendment). 
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has an affirmative responsibility to scruti-
nize the factual circumstances justifying 
the search warrant Condusory or ambig-
uous statements in the affidavit are insuffi-
cient This is particularly critical when the 
warrant authorizes nighttime intrusion into 
a person's home. 
Finally, while the analysis in the Appen-
dix to our opinion is good food for thought 
in a case where the state has argued the 
applicability of the good faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule, in joining the court's 
opinion I emphasize its narrow application, 
and in no sense intimate any view on 
whether the Leon exception does or does 
not make good policy, much less on wheth-
er it should or not have any vitality under 
our state constitution. Those questions are 
reserved for another day. 
JACKSON, J., dissents. 
APPENDIX 
The Leon Court, perhaps alarmed at soci-
ety's prospects of failure in the so-called 
"drug war/' premised the good faith excep-
tion on expediency. The Court concluded 
that the exclusionary rule's sole purpose 
was to deter police misconduct This view 
minimizes the history of the adoption of the 
Fourth Amendment and the development of 
the exclusionary rule itself. Origins of the 
Fourth Amendment are based not so much 
upon law enforcement misconduct in execu-
ting warrantless searches, as in concerns 
about the unreasonable issuance of gener-
al search warrants. The exclusionary rule 
was born as a constitutional remedy for 
violations of the Fourth Amendment gener-
ally, with no particular emphasis on police 
behavior. 
General Warrants 
General warrants have their derivation in 
thirteenth century universal authorizations 
granted to innkeepers to search guests for 
counterfeit currency. Stengel, The Back-
ground of the Fourth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, Part 
One, 3 U.Rich.LRev. 278,283 (1969). With 
the onset of the Age of Enlightenment and 
accompanying reform movements, Eng-
land's threatened monarch* issued sweep-
ing general warrants to search papers, 
books, and documents for evidence of sedi-
tion and libel against the Crown. For near-
ly a century, members of the private print-
er's guild used these warrants to seize and 
destroy the presses of printers who failed 
to join their union. Stewart, The Road to 
Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, 
Development and Future of the Exclu-
sionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure 
Cases, 83 ColumJLRev. 1365, 1369 (1983). 
James I, Charles I, and Charles II, rulers 
during the seventeenth century, instituted 
unprecedented general warrants allowing 
agents of the notorious Court of the Star 
Chamber to search virtually at any time 
and any place for seditious printed matter. 
See Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 
717, 726, 81 S.Ct 1708, 1713, 6 LEd.2d 
1127 (1961). Tax collectors were granted 
general warrants to enter castles and cot-
tages, at any time without notice, to en-
force the hearth tax. Not until a revolu-
tion which placed a reform king, William of 
Orange, upon the throne, and a suit for 
trespass by a member of Parliament, did 
judicial review effectively limit the reach of 
general warrants. Chief Justice Pratt 
(Lord Camden) concluded in Wilkes v. 
Wood, 98 Eng.Rep. 489 (1763): 
The defendants claimed a right, under 
precedents, to force persons houses, 
break open escrutores, seize their papers 
& c upon a general warrant, where no 
inventory is made of the things thus tak-
en away, and where no offenders names 
are specified in the warrant, and there-
fore a discretionary power given to mes-
sengers to search wherever their suspi-
cions may chance to falL [Such power] 
is totally subversive of the liberty of the 
subject 
Id. at 498. See also Entick v. Carrington, 
95 Eng.Rep. 807 (1765). These cases were 
known to the authors of the Fourth 
Amendment, and Wilkes v. Wood is gener-
ally regarded to be the formative inspira-
tion for the passage of the Fourth Amend-
ment See Boyd v. United States, 116 U S 
616, 631, 6 S.Ct 524, 533, 29 LEA 746 
(1886). 
APPENDIX—Continued 
Colonial Writs of Assistance 
In the American colonies, particular ex-
ception was taken to the practice of grant-
ing writs of assistance to customs officers. 
These writs, granted by King George II, 
were valid for the King's lifetime and 
granted unlimited power to the officers to 
search at anyplace and any time without 
the need for judicial review or subsequent 
proceedings. Stewart, The Road to Mapp 
% Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Devel-
opment and Future of the Exclusionary 
Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 Co-
tanXJtev. 1365, 1370 (1983). 
In 1760, King George II died and new 
writs were required. The colonists sought 
judicial relief from the new writs. James 
Otis, a prominent attorney in the service of 
the Crown whose position required him to 
seek the writs from the Superior Court, 
instead resigned his post and argued the 
cause on behalf of sixty-three Boston citi-
zens. N. Lasson, The History and Devel-
opment of the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution 58-59 (1937, 
Johns Hopkins Press; reprinted 1970, Da-
Capo Press). Years later, John Adams 
claimed it was James Otis's fiery denuncia-
tion of general warrants in open court that 
provided the spark for the American Revo-
lution. Id 
This historical review suggests that the 
issuance of flawed warrants was of great-
er concern to the drafters of the Fourth 
Amendment than was the conduct of offi-
cers charged with the duty to execute such 
warrants. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U.S. 294, 316, 87 S.Ct 1642, 1655, 18 
LE<L2d 782 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting) 
(describing the text of the original draft of 
the Fourth Amendment). 
The Exclusionary Rule 
An exclusionary rule was first applied in 
Boyd P. United States, 116 tLS. 616, 6 
S.Ct 524,29 LEd. 746 (1886). It is instruc-
tive that Boyd involved no issue of police 
tction or misconduct The challenge in 
Boyd was to a judicially-issued subpoena in 
a civil forfeiture case. Paralleling the cir-
cumstances under which the writs of assist-
STATE v. ROWE Utah 7 4 1 
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ance were condemned, Boyd involved a 
subpoena for books and papers of mer-
chants accused of unlawfully importing 
glass. Id. at 621, 6 S.Ct at 527. The 
Supreme Court concluded that because the 
papers were sought for what was essential-
ly a criminal process, forfeiture for cus-
toms duties, the Fourth Amendment ap-
plied. However, the Court did not order 
suppression directly on Fourth Amendment 
grounds. Rather, the Court reasoned that 
the forced production of incriminatory pa-
pers and documents would violate the Fifth 
Amendment and accordingly ordered sup-
pression of the material obtained under the 
subpoena. 
Twenty-two years later, a unanimous 
Court decided Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct 341, 58 LEd. 652 (1914), 
which firmly established the exclusionary 
rule as a fundamental principle of Fourth 
Amendment law. Defendant Weeks had 
been convicted of gambling, on the basis of 
persona] papers which were unlawfully 
seized. Before trial, Weeks moved for the 
return of his illegally seized papers. The 
Court held that the government was consti-
tutionally bound to return the improperly 
seized documents, which could not then be 
subpoenaed by the prosecution, and re-
versed Weeks9 conviction: Id at 398, 34 
S.Ct at 346. See also Schrock & Welsh, 
Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary 
Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 
Minn.LRev. 251,295-308 (1974) (discussing 
the impact of the Weeks decision). 
A few years later, the Court decided 
Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United 
States, 251 U.S. 385,40 S.Ct 182, 64 LEd 
819 (1920), and Gouled v. United States, 
255 U£. 298, 41 S.Ct 261, 65 LEd. 647 
(1921). The eombined cases framed the 
exclusionary rule as barring any use what-
soever of improperly seized evidence. 
Writing for the Court in Silverthome, Jus-
tice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated: 'The 
essence of a provision forbidding the acqui-
sition of evidence in a certain way is that 
not merely evidence so acquired shall not 
be used before the Court but that it shall 
not be used at all." 251 U.S. at 892, 40 
S.Ct at IK). Ultimately, and after further 
refinement, the Fourth Amendment exclu-
742 Utah 806 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
APPENDIX-Continued 
sionary rule was applied to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment 
Mapp v. Ohio, 867 tLS. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct 
1684, 1691, 6 LEd.2d 1081 (1961). 
Against this background, it would seem 
appropriate that courts considering the 
scope of the Fourth Amendment exclusion-
ary rule be mindful of the process of re-
view and issuance of the warrant, as well 
as the lawfulness of the police officer's 
execution thereof. 
The Trouble with Leon 
It is viewed from this historical perspec-
tive that United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897,104 S.Ct 3405, 82 LEd.2d 677 (1984), 
represents such a qualitative change in the 
development of exclusionary rule jurispru-
dence. Writing for the Court, Justice 
White offered three justifications for the 
conclusion that the exclusionary rule was 
aimed at police misconduct and had no im-
pact on the judicial review of warrant appli-
cations. First, he declared that the exclu-
sionary rule was not designed to deter 
judges from error. Id at 916,104 S.Ct at 
3417. "Second, there exists no evidence 
suggesting that judges and magistrates 
are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth 
Amendment...." Id Finally, and ''most 
important,0 judges are neutral judicial offi-
cers, not adjuncts to law enforcement ad-
ministration, and the exclusionary rule will 
have no practical deterrent effect on them. 
Id at 916-17, 104 S.Ct at 8417. 
The first and third assertions seem at 
odds with the fact that the exclusionary 
rule, as first "designed" in Boyd, was ex-
pressly created as a remedy for judicial 
error. Moreover, these assertions discount 
the historical concerns about the issuance 
of general warrants and writs of assist* 
ance. In the instant case, there is no alle-
gation of police misconduct in the warrant 
application process. The defect in the war-
rant might have been easily cured by care-
ful questioning by an attentive magistrate. 
This is likely the more common scenario 
when a warrant's validity is challenged. 
See State v. Marsala, 216 Conn. 150, 579 
A.2d 58, 67 (1990). Often the reviewing 
judge will simply evaluate the warrant ip> 
plication for gross errors of law or some-
thing out of the ordinary, acting, in effect, 
as a rubber stamp. See Goldstein, Tkt 
Search Warrant, the Magistrate, and Ju-
dicial Review, 62 N.Y.UXJtev. 1173,110 
(1987); Wasserstrom & Mertens, The & 
clusionary Rule an the Scaffold: Bui 
Was it a Fair Trial?, 22 Am.Criml.Re?. 
85,108-09 (1984) (citing statistical evidence 
of lax warrant review standards). Much of 
the exclusionary rule's vigor prior to Leon 
was in requiring the magistrate to assid-
uously exercise his or her Fourth Amend-
ment duty by carefully scrutinizing wu> 
rant applications. 
Justice White's second assertion, if true, 
calls into serious question the practical 
need for the Leon exception to the exclu-
sionary rule. He gives high marks to 
judges and magistrates, claiming that few 
issue warrants not firmly grounded in 
probable cause. If indeed this is so, but 
see id, the exclusionary rule would almost 
never be invoked in warrant-bud 
searches, even without the Leon doctrine, 
since the magistrate will have scrutinized 
the application and issued the warrant only 
upon a detailed and well-supported showing 
of probable cause. Thus, the societal costs 
of the exclusionary rule, a great concern 
for the Leon Court, will be minuscule m 
the context of cases where a warrant is 
obtained. 
It may additionally be questioned wheth-
er the societal costs of the exclusionary 
rule are as onerous as Justice White be-
lieves them to be. The Leon Court rea-
soned that the "marginal or nonexistent 
benefits produced by suppressing evidence 
. . . cannot justify the substantial costs of 
exclusion." 468 US. at 922, 104 S.Ct st 
8420. But several scholars who have ex-
amined Leon's "economic" conclusions re-
fute them as groundless in fact &eNsrt 
dulli, The Societal Costs of the Exclusion-
ary Rule Revisited, 1987 UilLLRev. 223, 
239 (exclusionary rule accounts for kss 
than two percent of case attrition); 1 W. 
LaFave, Search A Seizure f 1.3 at 46 a. * 
(2d ed. 1987 A Supp.1990). Moreover, 
while the societal coat of suppressing evi-
dence may in some respects be more tangi-
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ble—H surely prompts an understandable 
visceral reaction by many—the system's 
use of illegally obtained evidence is not 
without societal costs of its own. True, it 
may be, that freeing a criminal because the 
constable (or magistrate) erred is not an 
entirely satisfactory state of affairs. But 
b a society committed to the notion that 
governmental action as well as citizen be-
havior is subject to the rule of law, it 
should also be regarded as an unsatisfac-
tory state of affairs to countenance the use 
of evidence that should not have been un-
covered, under our rules, to convict a citi-
zen of some crim^ 
We believe the exclusionary rule may 
well have, as a substantial purpose, the 
objective of requiring careful judicial scru-
tiny of warrant applications. Simply put, it 
is unlikely magistrates are any more 
pleased to have their warrants "thrown 
outT by reviewing courts than are the po-
lice to have their evidence "thrown out" 
Such stimulation extends also to appellate 
review. Rigorous appellate review of 
search warrants ana the accompanying 
benefit of defining search and seizure law 
would be effectively precluded if Leon 
were given wide rein, as the court would 
have little occasion to proceed beyond an 
inquiry into the trial court's finding of the 
officer's good faith. Similarly, issuing 
magistrates who are less than zealous in 
their devotion to the Fourth Amendment 
would have little motivation to look beyond 
the face of the warrant, knowing that as 
long as the warrant is facially proper, the 
appellate court would not interfere in view 
of the officer's good faith in executing a 
facially proper warrant 
Were an officer permitted to rely on a 
facially valid warrant without more being 
required of him or her, there would be no 
incentive for advanced training which 
would enable officers to better fulfill their 
duty to uphold the constitutions of the 
United States and of this state. Moreover, 
the well-trained officer or prosecutor secur-
ing a warrant will be in a position to pre-
vent the very harm which led to the good 
faith exception. An officer who is motivat-
ed to prepare a constitutionally adequate 
warrant application will be less likely to 
rush through a warrant application, and 
will more carefully evaluate the sufficiency 
of probable cause, so that the warrant will 
withstand ultimate review and not merely 
gain the signature of an issuing magis-
trate. Similarly, the prosecutors who must 
argue the validity of warrants in court will 
be circumspect in their assessment of the 
sufficiency of probable cause when asked 
for advice before a warrant application is 
presented. 
Fourth Amendment Conclusion 
It may be persuasively argued that the 
exclusionary rule serves purposes beyond 
influencing the behavior of individual offi-
cers and officials. See, e.g., United States 
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 975-80, 104 S.Ct 
8430, 8453-56, 82 LEd.2d 677 (1984) (Ste-
vens, J. dissenting) (noting justifications 
for exclusionary rule not tempered with 
"good faith" exception as also including 
assurance of some remedy for violation of 
constitutional rights and as placing judi-
ciary beyond the "dirty business" of using 
the fruits of unlawful searches to secure 
convictions). But insofar as its purpose is 
to influence behavior, the rule can serve to 
promote discipline, thoroughness, and care 
on the part of all actors in the process—po-
lice who secure warrants, prosecutors who 
aid in that process, magistrates who issue 
warranto, and police who execute warrants. 
Any exception to the rule which focuses on 
the rule's impact on only one of those 
groups, officers who carry out searches, is 
open to legitimate criticism. 
As and when the appellate courts of this 
state aire squarely confronted with the 
question of whether the exclusionary rule 
existing by virtue of Article I, Section 14, 
of the Utah Constitution is subject to a 
Leon-type "good faith" exception, a 
healthy skepticism should permeate the 
courts' consideration in view of the trouble-
some analysis in Lean. 
